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Abstract 
By integrating a communications system with the existing power grid, smart grids provide end-to-end connectivity. 
This enables all entities and components integrated in the electricity supply system to exchange information without 
knowing the network’s structure. New services and applications such as demand response or virtual power plants 
that will aid to improve and optimize the use of electricity depend on the availability of a smart grid communication 
network. End-to-end communication networks require that the missing communications gap between consumers’ 
premises and the remaining energy network is bridged by deploying an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). 
Given the current liberalized electricity markets’ structure incumbent distribution system operators (DSOs) will 
control the AMI and the meter data. This gives rise to concerns about anti-competitiveness. We argue that 
leveraging the AMI in a social welfare maximizing way requires non-discriminatory access for all entitled parties to 
the (1) AMI and the (2) meter data through (3) interoperable standards. We discuss possible regulatory remedies to 
ensure a level playing-field for innovative services in smart grids and consider implications for research and 
regulation. 
1. Introduction  
A major future challenge for electricity grids is the growing addition of intermittent - often distributed - renewable 
energy sources (RESs). This challenge is exacerbated by the traditionally low degree of automation, monitoring, and 
communication within the electricity supply system, especially within distribution networks. Without fundamentally 
modernizing the grid’s infrastructure, RESs’ increasing penetration will result in a decline of the power grid’s 
reliability, resilience, efficiency, and environmental sustainability.  
Owing to recognizing the need for improved communication and coordination, the “smart grid” concept emerged. A 
smart grid can best be understood as a communications layer’s virtual overlay on the existing power grid. This 
overlay allows all actors and components within the electricity supply chain to exchange information which 
facilitates improved coordination of supply and demand (NIST 2009). To close the communications gap between 
consumers’ premises and the remaining energy network an AMI is required. In analogy to the telecommunications 
industry, the AMI including smart meters can be viewed as the “last mile” of smart grids as it ultimately connects 
utilities with consumers (Leeds 2009). In the telecommunications sector, the last mile is represented by the “local 
loop.” International regulators treated the local loop as a monopolistic bottleneck, since no alternative infrastructure 
was available and potential replication was not viable. New entrants in the telecommunications market needed 
access to the last mile facility to offer complementary services, such as internet services. Consequently, incumbents 
were mandated to grant unbundled access which allowed competitive downstream markets to be established (Cave 
2010).  
Similarly, competitors who seek to entry complementary markets in a smart grid need non-discriminatory access and 
control rights to essential facilities. Most of these innovative complementary services, applications, and products 
1 Interested readers can download an extended version of this paper at http://www.nrri.org/pubs/ 
telecommunications/NRRI_End_to_End_Smart_Grid_june11-12.pdf  which will help improve energy efficiency depend on seamless and reliable data exchange. Literature thus postulates 
to identify potential technological and regulatory bottlenecks at an early stage and find remedies to overcome them 
(ERGEG 2010; Hempling 2011; Pérez-Arriaga 2009). This is the aim of our paper. Our study therefore draws on the 
normative theory of regulation and applies insights from diverse literature streams. We investigate bottlenecks 
within a smart grid’s communication layer and discuss regulatory instruments that are adequate to relieve these. The 
following research questions guided this study: 
RQ1:   Are there bottlenecks within a smart grid’s communication layer? 
RQ2:   Do these bottlenecks obstruct the development of competitive and innovative complementary 
markets? 
RQ3:   If so, which regulatory instruments can remove these bottlenecks? 
The remainder of the paper is structured into five sections. Section 2 provides the theoretical background on 
bottleneck regulation and briefly delineates liberalized electricity market’s functional pattern. Section 3 describes 
the smart grids’ architecture and section 4 identifies potential bottlenecks therein. In section 5, we propose 
regulatory remedies to remove the bottlenecks. In the final section, we discuss the findings and implications and 
provide suggestions for future research. 
2. Background  
2.1. Bottleneck regulation 
If substituting a facility is neither economically nor technically feasible and the facility is moreover essential for 
reaching customers or to enter complementary markets it is regarded as a “bottleneck” or “essential” facility 
(Blankart et al. 2007). A facility is always labeled as such whenever economies of bundling make its duplication 
unfeasible and its costs are irreversible (Joskow 2005; Picot 2009; Viscusi et al. 2005). Hence, regulating access to 
such bottlenecks which discriminate in favor of incumbents is crucial to lower entry barriers for potential market 
entrants (Stigler 1968, p. 67). As without mandated access competition in these markets would not be feasible, they 
are regarded as incontestable (Baumol et al. 1982). Consequently, an essential facility’s owner has stable market 
power which can be abused in complementary markets in which the facility provides an essential input (Blankart et 
al. 2007; Salinger 1989).  
Thus, in order to avoid deadweight losses, promote maximum efficiency, and allow lively competition, non-
discriminatory access to essential facilities is subject to ex ante regulation (Blankart et al. 2007; Lipsky and Sidak 
1999). Hence, if high and non-transitory entry barriers are present (whether of structural, regulatory or legal nature) 
regulatory intervention is justified to influence the market structure (Blankart et al. 2007; Lipsky and Sidak 1999; 
Renda 2010). Most facilities that were regarded as essential in the past (for examples see Lipsky and Sidak 1999) 
were “tangible” in nature. However, there are also “intangible” bottlenecks based on intellectual property rights, 
such as proprietary standards, protocols, or interfaces. These could also hinder competition in complementary 
markets, as argued by the US Department of Justice (2002) and the European Commission (2004) in two antitrust 
cases against Microsoft (Renda 2004). 
2.2. Liberalized electricity markets’ operating principle 
This section provides a brief overview of liberalized electricity market’s regulatory, organizational, and technical 
structure. Within the electricity industry, three major areas of activity can be identified: generation, transport, and 
consumption. Since electricity markets’ deregulation, the generation and retail markets have been organized 
competitively. Conversely, the transport functions - transmission and distribution - continue to be treated as natural 
monopolies because of sunk costs, as well as economies of scale and scope in electricity delivery (Joskow and 
Schmalensee 1983). In order to avoid monopolistic exploitation of these natural monopolies, third party network 
access and revenues for network usage are regulated (Wilson 2002; Woo et al. 2003).  
Distribution system operators deliver power to end-consumers and are responsible for power quality and supply 
security in their respective area. Besides planning, operating, and maintaining distribution grids, DSOs are legally 
obliged to procure the information required for electricity suppliers’ (ESs) energy accounting tasks. ESs procure power for their consumers and charge them for the electricity that they use as well as for the network 
usage costs, the costs of balancing power, and the costs for metering services. The latter involve various tasks. To 
the most essential tasks pertain “purchase, installment and maintenance of the meter, meter data collection, 
management and provision of meter data to other market players” (ERGEG 2007). Traditionally, metering services 
were operated by DSOs acting as regulated monopolists. In many electricity markets, however, the metering market 
has recently been liberalized to increase competition and to promote innovation. Regardless of whether metering 
markets are liberalized or regulated incumbent DSOs are likely to dominate the metering service market and 
continue to act as “metering providers” (MPs) for several reasons: In regulated markets, DSOs will probably be in 
charge of the smart meter roll-out. For example, this is what is happening in the Netherlands and Sweden. In these 
countries DSOs continue to earn regulated returns. In competitive markets, DSOs will also almost certainly play a 
dominant role in the metering market because else they would face various disadvantages. On the one hand they 
would not only lose dependable revenue sources to a competing MP, but also long-established customer 
relationships which are valuable business assets. Moreover, as long as consumers do not actively choose another 
MP, DSOs already acting as MPs will remain responsible for providing metering services. This is very likely as to 
date there is very little consumer demand for metering services. Consequently new competitors from outside the 
industry are reluctant to enter the market, which results in DSOs continuing to act as regulated MPs. Thus, given 
electricity and metering markets’ characteristics in most markets DSOs will act as regulated monopolists in the 
metering market. 
3. Smart grid architecture 
From a technical perspective, a smart grid is comprised of three layers. Each of these layers integrates a multitude of 
digital and non-digital technologies and systems from the realms of telecommunication, information, and energy 
technology (see figure 1). From an architectural point of view, a smart grid can be best understood as an additional 
communication layer that is virtually overlaid on to the existing power grid and on which an application layer is 
built.  
By employing a layered approach of this kind, the design problem’s complexity is reduced, because the functionality 
is modularized in components and subcomponents (van Schewick 2010, pp. 50). By interconnecting formerly 
isolated components, actors, networks, and technologies, a smart grid facilitates the creation of a system of systems 
(NIST 2009). Hence, a smart grid can be conceived as a system product. By definition, this requires the components 
to be compatible. The different systems must function seamlessly with each other to produce the desired outputs. 
Each layer’s components perform specific functions and have well-defined interfaces for the upper layer in order to 
make their services available. Simultaneously, they make use of the layer beneath’s services. A smart grid therefore 
emulates the internet’s original design principle by employing an “end-to-end” architectural approach. Within this 
architecture application specific functionalities are implemented at higher layers at the network’s end hosts or end 
points, while lower layers are kept as general and application-independent as possible (Saltzer et al. 1981). 
In an end-to-end network, components and actors can send and receive data without knowing the network’s structure 
(Economides and Tåg 2009). The network itself therefore remains neutral. This encourages innovations at the 
network’s end (Cerf 2006a; Cerf 2006b) which is widely regarded as the key driver for the internet’s rapid 
development. The internet’s fast development is also characterized by low entry barriers and non-discriminatory 
access for innovators (van Schewick 2007). Similarly, in a smart grid the innovation is expected to come from the 
network’s end (FCC 2010). While there might be some innovation at the network’s core, the innovative applications 
and services at higher layers will provide the literal “smartness”.  
Hence, our work focuses on identifying bottlenecks that require regulatory interventions within the communications 
layer. The ultimate goal is to ensure a “neutral” smart grid that promotes entrepreneurship and grants non-
discriminatory access and low entry barriers for new market entrants. Figure 1: Smart grid architecture (based on Leeds 2009) 
4. Potential Bottlenecks  
Utilities have already deployed communication networks that connect parts of their infrastructure (almost solely 
transmission grids) with supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) to manage grid operations. By 
linking the existing utilities’ communication networks with smart meters, the AMI facilitates end-to-end networks. 
The AMI allows data to be transported back and forth between consumers and other market actors (see figure 2). In 
buildings, smart meters serve as central gateways to in-house devices such as home appliances, consumer 
electronics, water heaters, lighting systems, and programmable thermostats connected via Home Area Networks 
(HAN). Thus, to enable innovative applications such as demand response or virtual power plants authorized market 
actors like independent energy service providers need access and control rights for the meter data and the meter 
itself, for instance to send price signals, control appliances, or change tariffs. Thus, the AMI including smart meters 
and the meter data serve as essential inputs which can be deemed as synonymous with the last mile in 
telecommunications, as it acts “as the final leg delivering connectivity from a utility to a consumer” (Leeds 2009, pp. 
11). Also the AMI cannot be substituted or replicated within a reasonable time and/or cost frame due to substantial 
sunk costs and economies of bundling. Once DSOs deployed the new metering infrastructure, these sunk costs 
create a long-term cost asymmetry between DSOs “inside” the market and potential entrants “outside” the market 
and the replication of the infrastructure is practically and economically not feasible for competitors. 
The data retrieved from smart meters can also be regarded as essential inputs for authorized actors. The data aids 
them to provide services for improving grid management and monitoring, streamlining business processes, and 
enabling innovative energy efficiency measures and value-added services (ERGEG 2007; FCC 2010; OFGEM 
2010). Hence, it is crucial that MPs who are in charge of collecting and administrating the meter data, provide 
authorized parties with non-discriminatory and efficient access to the meter data in compliance with national 
security and privacy requirements.  
To ensure an efficient data provision also standardized data formats are necessary. Ultimately, the goal of smart 
grids is to enable actors and components to communicate end-to-end. Currently, only very limited information 
exchange is possible in power systems due to specialized rules for data exchange. For example, the core utilities’ 
information systems (SCADA) typically use their own communications protocols. These protocols only enable 
communication within subsystems, but impede communication between subsystems. Therefore to achieve end-to-
end interoperability, it is crucial to establish a smart grid’s communication network on a consistent set of open and 
non-proprietary communication protocols and standards (DKE 2010; ERGEG 2010; NIST 2010). Figure 2: Smart grid communications architecture mapping (based on NIST 2009) 
Overall we identified three critical bottlenecks areas: Rights to access and control the AMI and the meter data as 
well as interoperability. Given the current electricity markets’ characteristics DSOs are likely to be in control of the 
access to the AMI and the meter data as well as to considerably influence interoperability requirements for their 
respective distribution areas. They will therefore have manifold opportunities to discriminate against independent 
third parties in the complementary market. Several new smart grid applications and services such as demand 
response or virtual power plants will place DSOs and affiliated firms’ revenues in jeopardy. Thus DSOs have 
incentives to capitalize on their market power and control over the identified bottlenecks. Therefore without 
appropriate regulatory provisions in place, potential competitors will be deterred from entering the market. Local 
incumbent DSOs can raise rivals’ costs through practices like exclusive dealing, refusals to deal, or defining 
proprietary protocols. They can also abuse standards to increase competitors’ transaction costs and consumers’ 
switching costs (see Krattenmaker and Salop 1986; Salop and Scheffman 1987). Therefore as DSOs have both 
incentives and opportunities to exploit essential facilities in an anti-competitive way ex ante regulation is justified 
because  
(1) once DSOs have rolled out the AMI, high and non-transitory entry barriers for new market entrants exist 
(Stigler 1968), 
(2) liberalization in many electricity markets’ is still insufficient and thus will not tend towards effective 
competition in an acceptable time horizon, and 
(3) the application of competition law alone will not suffice to address market failures to guarantee rivals’ 
reliable, efficient, and non-discriminatory access to the facilities without a significant time lag. 
5. Potential regulatory instruments 
Regulators often develop intermediate regulatory approaches that fall somewhere between “quarantine” and 
“vertical laissez-faire” (Farrell and Weiser 2003). Quarantining is a classic structural remedy. It prohibits the 
monopolist from engaging in vertical integration by enforcing ownership unbundling. However, the bottlenecks’ 
owner often has the best opportunities and greatest economic interest in a vibrant complementary applications and 
service market (Farrell 2003). Structural remedies preclude any of these integrative efficiencies (Joskow and Noll 
1999). Regulators therefore seek to develop compromise approaches to have the “best of both worlds” (Farrell and 
Weiser 2003). On the one hand, they allow vertical integration. On the other hand, through conduct remedies they 
aim to ensure that bottlenecks are not abused. In the following we present and discuss remedies that may prevent 
critical bottlenecks’ emergence and assure non-discriminatory access to these facilities. 
5.1 Meter data and interoperability
Meter data are an essential input for facilitating numerous business processes as well as new applications’ efficient 
and seamless functioning. Hence, the data access mode should enable any authorized market actor to compete on a 
level playing field. Traditionally, DSOs provided metering services and the meter data. DSOs therefore had 
exclusive access to the data. Other authorized actors were only granted access upon request or on a pre-scheduled 
basis. In an end-to-end smart grid, however, meter data’s reliable and close to real-time 24-hour availability is 
crucial to enable new business models’ emergence. To prevent efficient complementary markets from emerging 
DSOs could for instance, distort competition by leveraging their control over the data to increase rivals’ transaction 
costs, define incompatible data formats or interfaces for each distribution area, or intentionally delay data access and provision. Hence, to enable efficient complementary markets in future smart grids all authorized parties have to be 
guaranteed equal access to an online data platform to recall data in (1) as close to real-time as possible, (2) a 
standardized and machine-readable format, and (3) the same granularity in which it is collected (ERGEG 2007).  
Today, data’s availability for independent third parties is still unsatisfactory, due to incomplete unbundling (ERGEG 
2007). Several regulatory agencies have hence recommended establishing an independent data platform accessible 
to third parties, or have already established such a platform as in the UK, Texas, and Ontario. Others have suggested 
that the function of data collection, management, and access should be completely decoupled by establishing an 
independent and neutral data service provider (ERGEG 2010; FCC 2010; OFGEM 2010). Either approach could be 
effective to guarantee efficient and non-discriminatory access to meter data. An independent single platform 
provider may be moreover able to provide the data more cost-effectively owing to economies of scale. This provider 
can also perform tasks such as meter registration and consumer switching (OFGEM 2010). 
Data’s seamless exchange requires open and non-proprietary standards and communication protocols that allow each 
component and actor within the smart grid to communicate end-to-end. As mentioned before, protocols and 
standards can resemble essential inputs (Renda 2004; Renda 2010). Whenever standards are regarded as essential, 
they point to a market with intra-system competition. In such markets, firms compete with each other on the level of 
components within a particular system. Dependent on the degree of interface information availability, systems are 
distinguished as either open or closed. Open systems benefit modular innovation, competitors’ market entry, and 
market dynamics (Langlois 2001; Nelson and Winter 1977). If intra-system competition is to work efficiently, it 
requires at least some openness and modularity (Langlois 2001). In respect of the research context, DSOs may use 
protocols and standards as “strategic weapons” to build closed systems in which they safeguard interface 
information. In order to prevent this threat ex ante, there is a wide consensus among policy makers, regulators, and 
scholars that smart grids should be open and modular (Brown et al. 2010; ERGEG 2010; NIST 2010).  
Hence, governments around the globe are fostering the emergence of open smart grid standards to ensure 
interoperability between components. These efforts are mostly coordinated by standard developing organizations in 
an attempt to identify or develop open and non-proprietary standards and protocols (see DKE 2010; ENSG 2010; 
METI 2010; NIST 2009; NIST 2010). The majority of these standardization processes rely on a consensus-driven 
approach. The aim is for various stakeholders, such as experts from industry, academia, governments, and 
associations to agree on standards and protocols (Brown et al. 2010). While these attempts and standardization in 
general are contentious issues within the literature (Farrell and Saloner 1986; Picot et al. 2008, pp. 54), the social 
benefits are very likely to outweigh the costs as far as smart grids are concerned (ERGEG 2010). Hence, 
government and regulatory bodies should support and monitor these cooperative standardization efforts.  
5.2 AMI  
Once the AMI is rolled out it becomes an essential facility that competitors cannot replicate practically nor 
reasonably within an acceptable time frame. This will result in a lack of competitive entry which will negatively 
affect investments in smart grids. High entry barriers (as a result of economies of scale and scope and high 
irreversible costs) as well as DSOs’ non-transitory and substantial market power erode the prospects of a sufficient 
number of new entrants developing new markets for novel services and products.  
Thus, leaving access to the AMI unregulated (which would result in negotiated access) runs the serious risk of 
discrimination or inefficient investment (Cave and Vogelsang 2003). Hence, regulatory intervention, in the form of 
open (or mandated) access is needed to secure transparent and non-discriminatory third party access to the AMI. The 
telecommunications sector’s experience suggests that the primary focus with regard to the smart grid’s last mile 
should be on attracting a reasonable number of entrants in the applications market to promote service-based 
competition. Open access implies competition based on services since several companies offer their services using a 
single infrastructure (van Gorp and Middleton 2010). There is a broad consensus in the literature that potential 
entrants should initially be granted favorable access conditions to the bottleneck infrastructures. But these conditions 
should be gradually adjusted over time contingent on the degree of replicability which depends on how the 
technology and its cost develop (van Gorp and Middleton 2010). Open access policies thus have to balance between 
encouraging investment and innovation on the infrastructure level in the long run and promoting service-based 
competition and application-level innovation in the short run. 6. Discussion and conclusion  
Seamless end-to-end communication is a prerequisite for an improved coordination of electricity generation, 
transmission, distribution, and consumption as well as for the emergence of new business models. This paper sought 
to identify facilities that can be classified as essential for smart grids (RQ 1). We examined whether these 
bottlenecks obstruct the development of competitive and innovative complementary markets (RQ 2). Our analysis 
was based on theoretical arguments and empirical observations. Furthermore, we presented and discussed the 
applicability of regulatory instruments which might help establishing equal access to the bottleneck facilities and 
prevent incumbents’ discriminatory behavior (RQ 3).  
We identified three critical bottleneck areas within the communication layer that can serve as essential inputs for 
competitors in the downstream market and may be used anti-competitively. However, one could argue that ex ante 
regulation is not indispensable. With respect to data access and the definition of a consistent set of open and non-
proprietary interface standards and data protocols, competition law might suffice to correct possible market failures. 
However, an excessive emphasis on competition distracts from the aim to rapidly increase energy efficiency and 
environmental sustainability (Hertin 2004; Kemfert 2004). One can raise similar objections with regard to entry 
barriers’ non-transitoriness. As replicability is generally not a binary variable (Cave 2006), one can argue that the 
AMI can be replicated if entrants find technical ways to bypass the facility. However, similar to telecommunications 
(Picot 2009; Renda 2010), DSOs’ market power alone already justifies (asymmetric) regulatory intervention.  
According to the public-interest theory (Christensen 2010), the paramount societal interest is to realize the 
environmental benefits that can be gained from AMI’s widespread adoption. Therefore, we argue that new market 
entrants have to be guaranteed a transparent and stable regulatory environment. Access rules regarding essential 
inputs are important elements of such a regulatory framework which also facilitates the emergence of intra-system 
competition (de Bijl 2005). If there are no effective regulatory provisions in place, DSOs might discriminate against 
complementary products’ unaffiliated producers or even prevent them from gaining access to the bottleneck 
facilities. The absence of complementary applications would then negatively affect the amount of independent 
innovation at the application level, since independent third parties would face  
(1) significant uncertainty about the future competitive environment, 
(2) threats of discrimination, which will reduce profits, and  
(3) the risk of DSOs imitating third parties’ innovations (van Schewick 2007).  
From a social welfare perspective, a decrease in independent applications is only relevant if this reduction cannot be 
offset. Owing to a smaller number of innovators, the amount and quality of innovations are also likely to be reduced 
(van Schewick 2007). Furthermore, DSOs have no economic interest in developing applications that decrease 
traditional and dependable revenues. However, for independent innovators such applications would be very 
compelling. Application level innovations would also spur intra-system competition which is crucial for increasing 
consumers’ interest in adopting and using green technologies. 
A sufficient condition for justifying regulatory intervention is met if societal benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, 
regulators have to trade off regulatory interventions’ benefits and the associated costs. As already outlined, the 
benefits gained from regulatory intervention include increased competition and application level innovation. From a 
public interest perspective, this increase in competition and innovation is only relevant if it increases social welfare. 
While this relationship is theoretically ambiguous (Katz 2002; Tirole 1988), in the study’s research context the 
presence of uncertainty and uncompensated spillovers is likely to result in a supply level below the social optimum. 
Furthermore, a smart grid can be considered a general purpose technology that will be required to drive future 
economic growth (Bresnahan and Greenstein 2001; Larsson 2009). Regarding the costs, regulatory intervention is 
associated with a distortion of incentives to invest and innovate in smart grid’s communication infrastructures. 
Furthermore regulation itself incurs costs. While the latter may be negligible, the former needs regulatory agencies’ 
particular attention.   
A few limitations have to be considered when interpreting the study’s findings. Although the analysis is grounded in 
an extensive literature review and is based on empirical evidence from various scientific domains the normative 
research approach can only establish the basis for future research. Our analysis built upon the public interest theory 
of regulation. Therefore, our aim was to produce a positive theory based on a normative analysis. Accordingly, we 
proposed regulatory measures that can correct market failures and prevent discrimination in future smart grids. 
Some scholars, however, criticize public interest theory because it claims that “regulation occurs when it should 
occur because the potential for a net social welfare gain generates a public demand for regulation” (Viscusi et al. 2005). However, in contrast to other theories of regulation (e.g., capture theory or credible commitment theory) the 
shortcomings of a normatively oriented research approach based on public interest theory can, in terms of validity, 
be addressed by involving a broad range of insights and stakeholder interests as done in our study. Nevertheless, 
further studies are needed to apply other theoretical and methodical approaches. This will help scholars generalize 
and further develop the propositions.  
Despite these limitations our study provides an in-depth analysis of potential bottlenecks that can reduce the socially 
optimal amount of innovations at the smart grid’s application level from where - similar to the internet - innovations 
are expected to come. This study thus contributes to the political and scientific discussion on whether regulatory 
actions are required to facilitate competition and innovation in smart grids and the instruments required to help 
address market failures (ERGEG 2010; Hempling 2011; Pérez-Arriaga 2009).  
Based on the study’s findings, future energy regulation should reconsider current regulatory barriers to remove 
barriers that stem from misaligned incentives. Especially DSOs which are the most affected parties in energy supply 
systems’ transition should be provided with appropriate economic incentives to promote the upgrading to smart 
grids. DSOs should also be incentivized by decoupling revenues from the amount of electricity delivered to 
consumers. Also a more efficient systemic and commercial integration of decentralized energy resources should be 
fostered by more extensively including measures for energy losses and quality of service in regulated grid charges 
than is currently done (Cossent et al. 2009; Langniß et al. 2009; Niesten 2010). Moreover, in order to encourage 
more R&D and risk taking with new smart grid approaches, national regulatory authorities should consider 
following OFGEM’s example by creating an “Innovation Funding Incentive” that allows DSOs in the UK to spend 
.05% of their regulated return on R&D projects, of which 80% can be passed on to consumers (Bauknecht et al. 
2007; OFGEM 2009). 
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